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In Malaysia, second largest palm oil producer worldwide, logging companies, palm oil corporations, and
even responsible citizens can now compensate their biodiversity impacts by purchasing Biodiversity
Conservation Certificates in an emerging new biodiversity market: the Malua BioBank. Biodiversity mar-
kets are part of a wider trend of marketisation and neoliberalisation of biodiversity governance; intro-
duced and promoted as (technical) win–win solutions to counter biodiversity loss and enable
sustainable development. The existing neoliberalisation and nature literature has tended to analyse these
processes as consequences of an inherent drive of capital to expand accumulation and submit ever more
areas of nature to the neoliberal market logic.
In contrast, I aim (a) to problematise the agency and the ‘‘work” behind marketisation of biodiversity,
challenging the story of (corporate-driven) neoliberalisation as the realisation of an inherent market-
logic (based on the a false conceptual state–market divide, often prevalent even in activist academic cir-
cles working on neoliberalisation of nature) and to see the state not only as regulator, but driving force
behind, and part of ‘‘the market”; (b) to question the myth of neoliberalisation as state losing control to
the market and to show how the state is using the biodiversity market as mode of governing; re-gaining
control over its forests and its conservation policy; and (c) to demonstrate empirically the distinction
between neoliberal ideology and practice, and to show that marketisation was based on pragmatic deci-
sions, not ideology-driven political action. My analysis is based on 35 qualitative interviews with actors
involved in the BioBank.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In Malaysia, second largest palm oil producer worldwide, log-
ging companies, palm oil corporations, and even responsible citi-
zens can now compensate their biodiversity impacts by
purchasing Biodiversity Conservation Certificates (BCCs) in an
emerging new biodiversity market: the Malua Wildlife Conserva-
tion Bank (Malua BioBank). For US$10 per 100 m2, producers, but
also multinational oil and gas corporations, can help protect the
last remaining orang-utans in Borneo – while addressing supply
chain impacts, integrating conservation strategies, identifying
branding opportunities and developing new sourcing strategies
(Malua BioBank, 2010). Individual consumers may offset their
personal biodiversity impacts with a mouse click; a piece of forestthe size of ‘‘a large garage” can be saved for US$5 at www.protect-
malua.org. While the BioBank was established to save one of the
last remaining orang-utan habitats and rehabilitate degraded for-
est, it also constitutes a for-profit business model through which
investment into nature is supposed to yield ‘‘competitive returns”
to investors (Sunjoto et al., n.d.: 7).
Biodiversity markets have proliferated across the globe, rising
from two to 45 existing schemes, with another 27 under develop-
ment (Madsen et al., 2011). The European Commission is currently
exploring the setup of the first transnational banking scheme.
These schemes are based on the idea of assigning a monetary value
to biodiversity habitat provision, resulting in its commodification,
sale, and sometimes trading in the form of habitat credits or certifi-
cates. With these credits for ‘‘conservation actions intended to
compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm to biodiversity
caused by development projects, so as to ensure no net loss of bio-
diversity” (Ten Kate et al., 2004), destructive biodiversity impacts
can be compensated through the conservation or rehabilitation of
habitat elsewhere. Habitat banking or biodiversity markets involve
2 It is important to point out that with purchase of BCCs, buyers agree that they ‘‘do
not represent an offset against clearing or degradation of [additional] other forests”
(Gripne, 2008). However, it became clear in the interviews that the purchases are
understood to represent compensation for previous damage, and that companies
motivations are to secure regulatory goodwill and a good relationship to the
government to be awarded more (logging) concessions in the future. There is no
reason to assume that companies will not continue logging and conversion in the
future.
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system for developers” (Eftec and IEEP, 2010: 2).
Important progress in understanding and theorising neoliberal-
ism and nature has been made in the critical neoliberal conserva-
tion literature (Sullivan, 2006; Igoe, 2010; Büscher, 2010a;
Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Brockington et al., 2008; Holmes,
2012; Liverman, 2004; Milne and Adams, 2012; McElwee, 2012;
Pokorny et al., 2010; for a good overview see Büscher et al.,
2012). This growing body of work yields important insights, but,
I argue, may focus too much on structural forces behind, and con-
straints of marketisation and neoliberalisation, analysing them as
corporate-driven processes and subsumed under some inherent
market-logic (e.g. Smith, 2007), based on a problematic conceptual
separation of markets and states. Explanations not only tend to
underplay the crucial role of the state in market construction,
but also fail to analyse it beyond its role as facilitating and regulat-
ing the market. Instead, as Malua illustrates, biodiversity markets
constitute instruments through which the state governs its natural
resources, its population and corporations. In the more structural
accounts, marketisation can end up being explained away simply
by reference to the fundamental ideas and ideologies of neoliberal-
ism, and although Castree (2008) and others recognise that such
thing as a ‘‘generic ‘neoliberalism’” doesn’t exist, and neoliberal
ideology is not synonymous with neoliberal practice, I suggest they
don’t go far enough in analysing these as fundamentally different,
and recognising their sometimes quite contradictory nature.
Recognising this divide between the neoliberal ideology – the
necessity ‘‘to subordinate social and political affairs to capitalist
market dynamics” (Büscher, 2011: 92) – and ‘‘actually existing
neoliberalisms” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) – requires a
radically agency-focused analysis (Knafo, 2010) of instances where
market instruments are used, by whom, and how they are legit-
imised. To move beyond explanations based on an expansionary
market-logic, situating it as (yet) another form of neoliberalisation,
I need to focus on the marketisation process itself, and the agency
behind it. It requires a methodological commitment to prioritise
the agents and institutions on the ground (Knafo, 2010), an analysis
of the productive power of the structures which constrain, but
importantly also facilitate agency of the powerful; situating the
BioBank in the dominant (transnational and local) discourses, based
on a historicisation in the political–economic power structures;
Sabah’s history of state cronyism, logging and palm oil. If we don’t
accept ‘‘neoliberalism’s core claim that markets are naturally and
spontaneously occurring phenomena [but that] how markets actu-
ally work is a product of social and political relationships” (Edwards
et al., 2012: 3), thenwe need to go further and challenge the concep-
tual state–market divide (still) so prevalent in IPE.
The aims of the paper are therefore threefold; (a) to problematise
the agency and the ‘‘work” behind marketisation of biodiversity,
challenging the story of (corporate-driven) neoliberalisation as the
realisation of an inherentmarket-logic (based on the a false concep-
tual state–market divide, often prevalent even in activist academic
circles working on neoliberalisation of nature) and to see the state
not only as regulator, but driving force behind, and part of ‘‘the
market”; (b) to question themyth of neoliberalisation as state losing
control to ‘‘themarket” and to showhow the state is using the biodi-
versity market as mode of governing (cf. Konings, 2010); re-gaining
control over its forests and its conservation policy and local popula-
tion; and (c) to demonstrate empirically the distinction between
neoliberal ideology andpractice, and to showthat in Sabah,marketi-
sationwas based on pragmatic decisionsmuchmore than ideology-
driven political action – while the neoliberal discourse has partly
penetrated local realities, it has been resisted, modified, and most
importantly instrumentalised for particular goals.
Understanding this agency is indispensable to challenge and
resist processes of marketisation and neoliberalisation of natureand to identify possibilities of change – because provoking change
is the whole point of critical scholarship (cf. Cox, 1986). Demon-
strating the contradictory nature of neoliberalism, its failures and
the ideology–practice divide, avoids reifying neoliberalism as a
hegemonic project and therewith exaggerating its power (Larner,
2003). Biodiversity markets are not only good case studies due to
their political relevance today, but also due to their theoretical
contradictions and practical problems, which arguably point to
the limits to neoliberalisation of nature. The Malua BioBank is a
particularly interesting example due to its international nature.
While established and operated with involvement of local and
international actors, the transnational political–economic struc-
tures in which it is situated are even more important: the certifi-
cates were intended to compensate2 for the devastating
biodiversity effects of (export) palm oil agriculture. Yet, marketisa-
tion has not been as successful as expected.
After this lengthy introduction, I first briefly discuss my theoret-
ical approach and the methodological agency approach, before
introducing biodiversity offsetting. After presenting the Malua Bio-
Bank as my case study, I analyse, firstly, the mobilisation of the
dominant discourses for the discursive legitimation of the BioBank
and, secondly, the instrumentalisation of the historically specific
material and institutional context which facilitated its setup; the
political economies of timber and palm oil, and the legal frame-
work in Sabah, Malaysia. Subsequently, I examine how actors oper-
ate in this historical context, and lastly, relate the analysis back to
the wider theoretical debates before concluding.2. Neoliberalism, neoliberalisation, nature and the state
Critical analyses, theorisations and empirical research on biodi-
versity markets are still in their infancy. Sullivan (2012, 2013a,
2013b) analyses biodiversity offsetting in the UK and Namibia,
the accounting framework used to calculate biodiversity values,
and the underlying ‘‘(anti-)ecological” assumptions (2013a).
Robertson researches wetland mitigation banking in the US as a
neoliberal strategy of stabilising capitalist relations of power and
accumulation (2004); criticising simplistic notions of economic
rationality (2009). Much of the critical neoliberalisation and nature
literature analyses commodification and marketisation of nature as
consequence of an inherent logic of capital to expand accumula-
tion, a deepening of ‘‘primitive accumulation” compelled by capi-
tal’s need for a ‘‘spatial fix” (Harvey, 2001). Mostly located in the
critical geography literature, work by, i.e., Mansfield (2004),
McAfee (2003), Bakker (2004, 2005), Perkins (2011), or Prudham
(2004) draws on Marx, Gramsci and/or Polanyi, as well as a num-
ber of eco-Marxists inspired by their work. In his excellent review,
Castree (2008) explores their analyses and synthesises their main
reasons why nature is being neoliberalised across the world. He
concludes that neoliberalisation is explained by (fractions of) cap-
ital pushing either (a) to overcome the economy–environment
contradictions by ‘‘bringing it more fully within the universe of
capital accumulation”; (b) for submission of the non-human world
to become ‘‘a means to the end of capital accumulation – period”,
(c) as a ‘‘‘degrading nature to profit’ strategy”, or, lastly, (d) as a
means of the state to overcome the inherent contradictions of cap-
italism (2008: 146–148).’
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tioned tendency to focus too much on structural constraints,
under-emphasising the role of (state)agency and conflating neolib-
eral theory and practise, prevalent in some of this literature. Fol-
lowing Konings (2010), I want to stress the distinction between
the view of neoliberalism as hegemonic discourse and the view
as social practice. He argues that ‘‘it is only on an ideological level
that neoliberalism ever was a return to classical liberalism,” and
examines ‘‘neoliberal practices not in terms of the subordination
of governments and citizens to the anonymous imperatives of
the market, but rather in terms of the creation, legitimation and
consolidation of new relations of control” (2010: 742). Neoliberal
practices don’t constitute market dis-embedding but ‘‘institutional
expansion (i.e. a process whereby particular relations of power
become anchored in people’s routine strategies and so are woven
into the fabric of social life)” (Konings, 2010). In order to analyse
social reality, we thus need ‘‘to move beyond an account of neolib-
eralism that is consistent with its self-description, i.e. as the subor-
dination of governmental authority and public purpose to the
disciplinary pressures of disembedding markets” (2010: 748) –
going beyond Polanyi’s (1957) idea of a ‘‘double movement”,
according to which markets require ‘‘re-embedding”, because this
still presupposes a pre-existing expansionary market-logic. The
latter illustrates ‘‘the persistence of an economistic understanding
of the market as a sphere governed by actors’ natural, pre-social
propensities and not structured and produced through the norms,
conventions and rules provided by institutions” (Konings, 2010:
745, based on Beckert, Jones and Krippner; see also Krippner,
2001). This conceptualisation ignores that markets are themselves
the ‘‘product of politics” (Chang, 2002); which presents itself as
‘‘non-political” (Beck, 2000: 122).
The methodological agency-focus (Knafo, 2010) sees agency not
as object of analysis (ontologically), but as a lens through which we
observe structures (methodologically). This enables historicisation
without falling into the pitfalls of determinism – and without reify-
ing social reality (Sewell, 1982) – based on the recognition that
‘‘the significance of social dynamics is not given by the structures
themselves, but by what people do with them” (Knafo, 2010:
504). It requires an assessment of how powerful agents (such as
the forestry department) mobilise and instrumentalise structural
power relations to project and advance their interests. Agency lies
in creating, reproducing and mobilising structures, such as dis-
courses, beliefs, material dependencies and laws. This approach
is essential so as not to end up explaining biodiversity markets
with reference to some inherent logic – and allows me to focus
on what practices affect and do, rather than what they say
(Konings, 2010: 743). This enables me to see how biodiversity mar-
kets represent ways of governing nature – and (re)gaining control
over nature.
3. Investing into biodiversity – offsetting, marketisation and
beyond
In the transnational discourse, biodiversity governance is
increasingly becoming subject to this ‘‘market-logic”. Following
the Stern review on the economic cost of climate change (2007),
G8+5 environment ministers commissioned a study on ‘‘The Eco-
nomics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity” (TEEB, 2010) to analyse
the global economic benefit and costs of biodiversity (loss). The
report, according to which the annual economic cost of biodiver-
sity and ecosystem degradation lies between US$2 and US$4.5 tril-
lion (TEEB, 2010), helped mainstream monetary valuation of the
(ecosystem) services we derive from our natural environment.
The ecosystem services framing is supposed to create awareness
and political support for their protection, based the recognition
of the value of nature, or the ‘‘‘dividend’ that society receives fromnatural capital” (TEEB, 2010: 7). Innovative market instruments are
supposed to internalise nature’s value into the wider monetary
economy (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010), to distribute scarce
conservation resources most efficiently, and to preserve ecosystem
services at the lowest possible cost (Ferraro and Simpson, 2002).
The first offsetting scheme was established in the US in the
1970s, and since then, the instrument has proliferated around
the world, enthusiastically embraced by mining, construction,
and oil industries, investors and many governments (ICMM,
2005), creating a rapidly expanding 3+ billion dollar business
(Timbervest, n.d.), with third parties specialising in enhancing,
restoring and protecting wetlands to sell credits, regardless of
whether the areas were ever supposed to be cut down or not
(Bayon, 2002).4. Sabah’s forests, orang-utans, palm oil and the BioBank
Malaysia is an emerging economy characterised by unprece-
dented economic growth and booming large-scale palm oil agricul-
ture and commercial exploitation causing deforestation and
biodiversity loss (Nagle, 2009). International agencies are involved
in a number of biodiversity projects.
The Malua BioBank is situated in the state of Sabah on Borneo
(Fig. 1). Sabah’s biodiversity policy is considered more ambitious
than national policy; however, the state government has simulta-
neously pushed timber extraction, premature re-logging and forest
conversion to maximise legal and illegal timber and palm oil rev-
enues. Almost all licensed forest has been logged to near exhaus-
tion and timber production declined by over 95% from the 1970s
(Reynolds et al., 2011: 3175). Much selectively logged land has
been clear-cut and converted to palm oil plantations, leaving vast
areas damaged (Reynolds et al., 2011). The forestry department
reclassified protected areas as production forest, and allegedly
even slopes as non-slopes, for additional logging (SarawakReport,
2012a). Palm oil agriculture now occupies 87% of all cultivated land
(Toh and Grace, 2006) – at least 80% of that area directly replaced
natural forest (Toh and Grace, 2006; Wakker, 2005). Corporations
are criticised for water and air pollution (through fertiliser runoff
and mills, resulting in decreasing fish stocks, flooding and degrada-
tion), infringement on indigenous rights (expansion into local
land), and exploitation and abuse of its (foreign) workers (inter-
views; Dayang Norwana et al., 2011). Government regulation is
insufficient; implementation and monitoring largely lacking.
Sabah’s forests are managed by the Sabah Forestry Department.
Approximately 1,000,000 ha, including the Malua forest reserve,
are concessioned out to Yayasan Sabah (Sabah Foundation) to
finance poverty alleviation programmes and scholarships for Saba-
hans. The BioBank covers 34,000 ha of this commercial forest
reserve, situated between the Danum Valley Conservation Area,
one of the last untouched tropical lowland rainforests on Borneo,
and oil palm plantations. Five villages exist in the neighbourhood
of the BioBank.
The BioBank was established in 2008 to protect biodiversity and
restore forest structure and functioning. The primary actors
involved were the forestry department, the private investment
company New Forests and Yayasan Sabah. The forestry department
is known for its open-minded approach to conservation and alter-
native financing mechanisms, but considered rather hard-lined
towards local communities and enforcement of forestry rules.
New Forests Pty Limited is an Australian-registered company which
manages investments in environmental markets, targeting invest-
ment opportunities in Malaysia, ‘‘with a strategic focus on high-
value tropical hardwoods” (NewForests, n.d.). Together with the
US-based asset management firm Equator LLC, it manages the Eco
Products Fund (EPF), a US$100 million private equity vehicle which
Fig. 1. Malua forest reserve in Sabah, Malaysian Borneo (Butler, 2008).
Table 1
Overview of interviewees.
Institutions Interviewees
New Forest employees Former BioBank manager 1
BioBank manager 1
Government actors Forestry department: director, two high-
level officials
3
Wildlife department: high-level official 1
Yayasan Sabah/Sabah Foundation: high-level
official
1
Rangers 3
Conservationist/scientific
expert
Hutan: member of staff 1
Civil society Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs):
LEAP (Land Empowerment Animals People),
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), SAM
(Sahabat Alam Malaysia, Friends of the Earth
Malaysia)
6
Indigenous people Organisation representing indigenous
communities: PACOS
4
Local community members: male head of
village, three men, three women, male
teacher
8
Palm oil industry Oil palm plantations: directors/managers 3
Oil palm lobbyists: Malaysian Palm Oil
Council: director
1
Timber industry Timber corporations: executive directors 2
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US- and UK-based investors (NBU, n.d.). Yayasan Sabah, the license
holder, traditionally exploited its concessions for timber, though
significant areas are now covered with oil palm and some set aside
for conservation. Much of the concession area has been subject to
premature re-logging and large-scale conversion (Reynolds et al.,
2011).
This study is based on semi-structured in-depth interviews
with 35 individuals in Malaysia between August and October
2012 (Table 1).
In 2006, the forestry department and Yayasan Sabah, in cooper-
ation with NGOs and financial support from the US government,
decided to set aside the Ulu Segama-Malua area for conservation
(SFD, n.d.). The American–Malaysian conservation NGO LEAP first
proposed the setup of a BioBank and facilitated communication
between the forestry department and New Forests (see Fig. 2).
The director of LEAP, who entertains close personal ties with the
forestry department, chairs the advisory committee. Legally, the
BioBank is a joint venture between the forestry department and
the EPF, jointly managed by New Forests and Equator LLC.
Biodiversity Conservation Credits (BCCs) are sold to corpora-
tions and individuals. Purchase is voluntary. One BCC represents
100 m2 of protected forest, costs US$10, and is envisaged to be
tradable on a future market. BCCs are registered at TZ1 Limited
(now Markit), a multi-credit environmental markets registry
(Silver, 2009). During the festive launch of the BioBank, four log-
ging companies were announced who bought BCCs totalling US
$215,000. The operation of the BioBank is illustrated in Fig. 3 and
the responsibilities of the different actors in Fig. 4.5. Preparing the ground and talking the market into being – the
discursive legitimation of BioBanking in Sabah
To begin, I examine how the (transnational) discourse sur-
rounding biodiversity banking has entered the local reality in
Sabah and been used and instrumentalised to legitimise the Bio-
Bank. The narrative around the BioBank enables a particular anti-
political (Büscher, 2010b) problem construction and the discursive
positioning of the BioBank as its solution. I will focus on the pro-
ductive power (Knafo, 2010) of these discourses and their mobili-
sation to depict different actors in particular ways, positioning
them as saviours or threats to biodiversity in Sabah.5.1. From the transnational to the local – ‘‘Selling nature to save it”
(McAfee, 1999: 133)
The international discourse, based on the ecosystem framing
elaborated above, is supposed to demonstrate to business leaders
that ‘‘protecting nature can be a profitable corporate priority and
smart global business strategy” (Dow CEO Andrew Liveris in
Walsh, 2011). If nature’s services can be measured and represented
as credits and debts, ‘‘they are more easily integrated as benefits or
costs in economic decision-making” (Madsen et al., 2010: 1). This
discourse sits comfortable within dominant neoliberal discourses
related to sustainable development, green growth and green econ-
omy; ‘‘mobilising metaphors” whose ‘‘vagueness, ambiguity and
lack of conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological dif-
ferences, to allow compromise and the enrolment of different
interests, to build coalitions [and] to distribute agency” (Mosse,
2004: 663). It resonates with the (ecological) modernisation dis-
course, based on ideas of compatibility of economic growth and
Fig. 2. Setup of the BioBank (own figure).
Fig. 3. Operation of the BioBank (Malua BioBank, n.d.).
282 A. Brock / Geoforum 65 (2015) 278–290environmental protection and (economic) development as mod-
ernisation. Internationally, this is promoted through summits
(Rio, Rio+20), publications (TEEB) and (non)governmental organi-
sations and platforms (Business and Biodiversity Offsets Pro-
gramme, Ecosystem Marketplace).
In Sabah, its influence is clearly visible and has gained support
in the policy arena, civil society, and the business world; promoted
by transnational organisations active in Sabah, (international)
NGOs, government officials and forest officers. It translates into,
e.g., REDD+ (Reducing Emissions through Deforestation and ForestDegradation) preparation programmes and PES projects. The Uni-
ted Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Global Environ-
ment Facility (GEF) spent over US$5 million on programmes such
as ‘‘Institutionalizing Payments for Ecosystem Services” in Malay-
sia (UNDP-GEF, n.d.). LEAP’s number one strategic focus is on
building partnerships and projects through PES (n.d.). Through
their material influence, international organisations actively shape
the discourse in Sabah and promote certain ideas and values. They
reach out to other actors through workshops, trainings and capac-
ity building (e.g. for indigenous communities):
Fig. 4. Operation of the BioBank, responsibilities of actors (own figure, based on interviews).
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REDD, we stay in the hotel, we eat very good food . . . a lot of
money is spent on consultation, but . . . we are very sceptical.
They only think of what is the strategy of greening the hut
the soft way (indigenous interviewee).
These programmes also play ideological roles: by legitimating
institutions and practices such as PES, they ‘‘reflect orientations
favourable to the dominant social and economic forces” (Cox,
1983: 63). This process is not directly visible: no interviewee refers
to international organisations explicitly when asked about the Bio-
Bank. However, every interviewee repeatedly mentions REDD+,
PES and carbon credits, and the discourses attached to these pro-
jects, pushed forward especially by the GEF and UNDP.
State actors selectively use these discourses and the financial
value framework attached to them. One forestry official, when
asked about the benefits of the BioBank for communities down-
stream, responds:
Not having logging in Malua is already helping by mitigating
some of these impacts [on water quality by palm oil compa-
nies]. This is more or less providing services to downstream. If
one were to capitalise on that then we would have to look
who is willing to pay, for clean water for example.
Local officers and New Forests employees reproduce this narra-
tive, ‘consulting’ with local people and delivering presentations
and workshops to raise the acceptance of the BioBank. NGOs rea-
lise the material benefits and possibilities to gain power and legit-
imacy by adopting the hegemonic discourse. As one WWF
employee, very active in the promotion of a green economy-
approach to conservation in Sabah, explains:
so if you have some of the NGOs who are more aligned with the
aid agencies . . . if we are aligned more to [EU policies] . . . then
there is a little more acceptance of us by the state government.
One wildlife officer explains how his department consciously
adopts the financial value framework to please funding agencies:[They ask:] ‘What benefits do we have?’ . . . It’s always the eco-
nomic returns, always main agenda . . . Suddenly there is an
orang-utan population in this area. How do you value it? It’s
invaluable . . . so we always argue . . . They always ask: ‘How
then will Sabah or Malaysia benefit from this?’ We always
[say]: ‘No, you can’t just look at the real benefits in terms of
monetary. You must see the [intrinsic] value that you cannot
see . . . this is very invaluable’ . . . When we develop this area A,
and then we start to open it to the tourists, and we get this con-
servation fee, entrance fee, you name it, camera fee, then we
present to finance ministry; ‘This is what we get from this area
at the moment, and if we do more of this . . . then we get this X
revenue’. Then they’ll say: ‘Yes, ok. How much do you want?
And what is the timeframe that you can get even?’
Lastly, the agency of individual change agents is crucial in
spreading the discourse, most importantly the forestry director.
All interviewees who know him directly quote him repeatedly: ‘‘
[The director] always says . . .”; ‘‘Selling Love. Love is not
enough . . . Love for nature, for the environment”; ‘‘We were told
love for sale”. The director of New Forests is another important
individual: ‘‘he has been a spokesperson, a sort of ideas person
for biodiversity trading for some time, so it was like a pet project”
(New Forests representative).
5.2. From adoption to resistance, modification and instrumentalisation
The transnational narratives have clearly penetrated and
shaped local realities in Sabah; introduced by (transnational)
(non)governmental elites, but adopted and reproduced on the
ground, ‘to get things done’. The latter is exemplified by local
NGOs, forestry officers, employees of Yayasan Sabah and rangers;
frustrated by ongoing biodiversity loss and degradation. Their
response is more pragmatic than ideological; due to the lack of
government funding, these actors take advantage of, and use the
discourse for the benefit of conservation. As one Yayasan Sabah
official explains:
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Datu, there was a carbon sequestration project . . . Then, people
are talking about REDD . . . eventually BioBank came in. They
said: yeah, maybe it’s another way to get money . . . Why not,
we tagged along and see what happens.
When a New Forests employee tells me about the criticism she
encountered, her pragmatism becomes very clear:
There was that general feeling that goes with carbon credits too,
that people can just pay and carry on their lives . . . I know that
there are feelings out there. I don’t share it. I think however you
get the money, however you protect the forest . . . whatever it
takes.
Many individuals I interviewed are very devoted and work hard
to protect Sabah’s wildlife and forests, viewing the BioBank as an
additional channel of acquiring conservation funds. Some, like this
indigenous woman, have become more pragmatic over the years:
Initially, when we were younger, we didn’t want money [from
corporations], but we also had to be practical . . . people were
really so poor . . . In the end, we also thought: Well if Shell wants
todo something [to] cleanse the sins . . . Wasn’t itmotherTheresa
who saidwherever themoney is from, [if] it’s for the cause of the
marginalised poor, suffering children andwomen . . . What is the
money that cannot be cleansed with tears?
People not only act pragmatically (rather than ideologically);
they resist, modify and intrumentalise these narratives. Not sur-
prisingly, indigenous people are most vocal in their opposition to
the idea of offsetting: ‘‘a ridiculous idea. How can you do
that? . . . What is the principle? The value? The philosophy of doing
that? The foundation of that?” However, scepticism and doubt can
be traced in other interviews – people are appropriating and mod-
ifying the discourse to make sense of their realities. One example is
the repeated referral to ‘‘love for sale”, or ‘‘selling love” by a num-
ber of interviewees. This quote is not meant as a critique of the idea
of commodification or marketisation (indeed, it seems to be
regarded a great PR strategy). Nevertheless, it shows that the very
concept of ecosystem services and the economic reductionism (the
reduction of social relations and individual behaviour to market
incentives, quantified monetarily, prioritising private ownership
and market-based management, as Carolan defines it in Büscher,
2011) on which it is based don’t adequately characterise the local
relationship to nature.
5.3. Oversimplified, apolitical and localised problem construction
To legitimise the setup of the BioBank, the complexity of the
drivers of biodiversity loss in Sabah must be reduced to the endan-
germent of the orang-utan. According to state, corporate and civil
society actors, hunting and poaching by local indigenous commu-
nities and (foreign) plantation workers and the lack of financial
resources to stop them are the main drivers of biodiversity loss
in Sabah. This problem construction is based on the view of local
communities and workers as rational actors who react solely to
material incentives (again invoking the same economic reduction-
ism, Ibidem) and dissemination of information, disregarding cul-
tural traditions and customary preferences. It reinforces a very
particular view of indigenous communities (and foreign workers)
as endangering wildlife, and a reduction of their agency to hunting
and poaching, especially by state actors (interviews). Agency to
protect biodiversity (to educate locals and patrol the area) lies with
the forestry department, but also the (Australian) investment com-
pany; ‘‘[New Forest] came here and wanted to protect forest . . . [I
asked:] how can ‘you guys’ protect the area?” (local community
member).This view plays into the broader modernisation and develop-
ment discourse and the positioning of indigenous people versus
the civilised state/corporate world, instrumentalised to pressure
people into consenting to palm oil agriculture on their land – in
contrast to the backwards, uncivilised native subsistence living:
‘‘Of course we are always asked: you want development? Or you
want to remain backwards?” (indigenous interviewee). Histori-
cally, the corporate sector – previously the timber, and now
increasingly the palm oil industry – has been presented as a vehicle
to catch up with (Western) development. ‘‘[D]evelopment is equa-
ted with modernisation. Modernisation is equated with wage
labour, mass production using improved technology and high level
consumption” (Majid-Cooke, 1995: 222); with benefits trickling
down to local populations, whose native subsistence lifestyles
are considered to contradict modernisation. The idea of sustainable
(conservation-friendly) development, within which offsetting fits
so well, allows for the continued sovereign development, without
having to publicly give into Western pressures to conserve
orang-utan habitat or limit palm oil production. These discourses
do not merely float around, they are invoked and reproduced (cf.
Knafo, 2010); effectively empowering and legitimising the forestry
department, which cooperates with palm oil companies. To limit
hunting, one palm oil executive explains:
Now the gate [his company’s security forces] has been given
strict instructions: No firearms allowed . . . our role [is] watch-
ing the area, giving our manpower for [the forestry department]
to watch over boundary, so there will be no outside intrud-
ers . . . maybe in the future, [we could have] uniforms that sig-
nify our authority,hereby effectively establishing his company as the real saviour
of Sabah’s biodiversity.
The scientific evidence of the destructive impact of palm oil
industry is often straight-out denied or downplayed by business
and forestry officers (in the interviews, but also publicly, e.g. by
the CEO of the Malaysian Palm Oil Council, Basiron, 2010). When
asked about the necessity to reduce global palm oil consumption,
one high-level forestry officer explains: ‘‘they can always improve
the yield [and] do a bit of greening activities”. Most interviewees
see biodiversity loss as an apolitical, exclusively local problem
which can be solved through technological advancement. The sys-
temic causes of deforestation in Sabah – industrial logging, conver-
sion and high-level corruption (SarawakReport, 2012a) – are not
problematised. Due to the material influence of these powerful
stakeholders, policy action is centred on less damaging activities
(hunting and fishing by local people) rather than the real drivers
of biodiversity loss. This enables the framing of the BioBank as a
solution to biodiversity loss in Sabah.
5.4. ‘Nothing to lose’ – the BioBank as win–win-solution
This solution is discursively grounded in the hegemonic dis-
course on the need for commodification and competition (intervie-
wees). ‘‘We want conservation to pay. Because love alone will not
get us anywhere”, I am told by one forestry official; ‘‘If you love
something, you are willing to invest” – [we need to] ‘‘capitalise
our natural capital”. ‘Love for nature’ is equated with ‘paying for
nature’, and associated with market-thinking, or, to borrow from
Perkins, ‘‘inextricably conflated with the promise of profitable mar-
ket logic” (2011: 563). Similarly, ‘‘[c]onsumers of the certificates”
are equated with ‘‘people who love the environment” (another for-
estry official). Therewith, nature becomes consumable. As the
managing director of New Forests explains: ‘‘The Malua BioBank
translates rainforest protection into a saleable product so that bio-
diversity conservation can compete with other land uses on a com-
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plexities of local conservation need to be reduced and centred
around the orang-utan for marketisation. Holmes argues that ‘‘[t]
he importance of spectacle and image may have important biodi-
versity consequences as only some species and places have the
requisite qualities to be turned into marketable commodities”
(2012: 199; also POST, 2011). Consequently, the orang-utan needs
to compete with timber and palm oil in order to be preserved. This
reductionism is not new and can be observed elsewhere. WWF, for
example, concentrates its conservation efforts on ‘priority regions’
and ‘priority species’ that are appealing and suitable to attract
donations. The Malua area was chosen for the BioBank because
of its orang-utan population, strategic location and PR potential:
the ‘‘orang-utan effect” (forestry official); ‘‘a great selling point”
(conservationist). Simultaneously, the complex socio-natural rela-
tionship between nature and humans is reduced to the monetary
dimension (the economic reductionism described above). One
indigenous interviewee criticises: ‘‘What has, say, an American
family got to [do with Malua]? They haven’t seen the land”. The
drive for profits is legitimised:
[Shell, a potential buyer, asked:] ‘Do you have an issue if some-
one from New York makes tons of money through the Bio-
Bank?’ . . . No, I have no issue. If he has the vision to support
something like the Malua BioBank, he has every right to make
some profit (LEAP).
Lastly, the BioBank is presented as an ‘‘anti-political” (Büscher,
2010b) solution to biodiversity loss, reduced to an innovative and
progressive opportunity to generate conservation funds and profits
for investors, and a technical instrument, grounded in politically
neutral, ‘objective’ scientific and economic rationales. The former,
legitimised by reference to scientific studies and organisations, is
based on the need for a buffer zone for orang-utan protection; a
corridor to connect orang-utan habitats and avoid interbreeding.
It resonates well with international discussions on ecosystem ser-
vices and ‘natural capital accounting’, which are made to sound
apolitical. The latter is based on the need for conservation to be
profitable and to compete with alternative land uses. The presenta-
tion as technical is visible through the repeated referral to the advi-
sory body as the ‘‘technical committee” and biodiversity offsetting
as a ‘‘technical process”. The language used to promote the Bank
(address supply chain impacts, identify branding opportunities,
develop new sourcing strategies) hides the important political
implications of these strategies. It is based on the depiction of
the BioBank as a win–win solution. As McAfee explains,
neoliberal environmentalism promises to foster greener eco-
nomic growth, but with a human face: a multiple-win outcome
for nature, private investors and publics, including the poor, yet
one that requires minimal public expenditure (2012: 109).6. Conservation, capital and corruption in Sabah – a political
economy account
To understand conservation in Sabah, one needs to situate the
BioBank in its institutional, material and legal context; to under-
stand timber politics, the role of palm oil, and the surrounding
legal structures and power relations. I analyse how these struc-
tures empower certain agents and enable particular policy
decisions.
6.1. Capital accumulation, palm oil and the state
‘‘Capitalist societies are systemically dependent on economic
growth/capital accumulation” (Newell and Paterson, 1998: 691).It is the task of the state to sustain the rule of the market, protect
private property rights to advance economic growth, and promote
the general interest of capital (Ibidem, based on Burnham). ‘‘Main-
taining capital accumulation is therefore a central part of the main-
tenance of state legitimacy” (Newell and Paterson, 1998: 691).
The most important source of capital accumulation in Sabah is
the palm oil industry. The state government’s 7.5% sales tax on
palm oil constitutes the single largest contributor to Sabah’s GDP,
adding up to 40–50% of the entire state budget (Pang, 2011). Under
its Economic Transformation Programme, the government initiates
and funds palm oil projects (ICE, 2012). Palm oil corporations
entertain very close relationships with the government. When
asked about the involvement of the industry in conservation, one
forestry official responds:
If you compel them to do it, they won’t. Not by legislation. You
just talk to them. Look, you’re making too much money. Let me
help your reputation. We do the restoration of this forest, you
give us the money. And we will acknowledge your contribution
and you can rip the publicity. That’s what [company x] is doing.
Palm oil has become transnational capital of global importance,
creating ‘‘transnationalised circuits of accumulation and produc-
tion” (Robinson in Pye, 2010: 852). Most privately-owned Malay-
sian companies are either subsidiaries of, or have themselves
become, transnational corporations investing abroad (Pye, 2010).
Large-scale export-oriented plantation agriculture including palm
oil has been discursively and financially supported by multilateral
financial institutions including the World Bank, the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UNDP (Tauli-Corpuz and
Tamang, 2007). The International Monetary Fund has been criti-
cised for writing grants to Wilmar, the world’s largest palm oil pro-
ducer with horrible environmental and social records (FPP, n.d.).
Yet, these power structures have no inherent causal effects or sig-
nificance ‘‘outside of the way they are historically implemented
and exploited by specific agents” (Knafo, 2010: 513). Rather than
focusing on the constraints they imposed, I’ll examine more closely
their ‘‘productive leverage” (Knafo, 2010: 505) and what is
achieved through these structures. First, however, I will briefly
elaborate on the involvement of the government in the timber
industry.
6.2. Forests as political capital
Sabah’s forests are not only natural and economic, but also
political capital, and the structural dependence instrumentalised
for the benefit of policy makers. The money raised by Yayasan
Sabah through the sale of logging permits is frequently redirected
by/to politicians. I am told by one Yayasan official that the founda-
tion is ‘‘actually [a] political tool. Whoever is in power will use it to
generate more money. Politics without money [is] no politics”. In
2012, documents were leaked by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption
Commission which revealed that the Sabah chief minister (chair-
man of Yayasan Sabah) was involved in a million-dollar timber
scandal, subject to high-level political cover-up (e.g.
SarawakReport, 2012b; Butler, 2012; Koswanage, 2013). He is cur-
rently subject to criminal investigations in three different coun-
tries for laundering US$90 million from bribes for timber licenses
(Global Witness, 2012; Koswanage, 2013). The largest foreign-
owned bank in Malaysia, HSBC Bank, which acted as trustee for
the BioBank, enabled the movement of this capital abroad
(SarawakReport, 2012c). Victims include indigenous communities,
who lost access to their native lands and hunting grounds
(SarawakReport, 2012c) – a classic case of Harvey’s accumulation
by dispossession (2004).
The Malua BioBank must be analysed in light of this history of
state cronyism and the patron–client politics, rooted in its colonial
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analysis is worth quoting at length here:
Links between top state patrons and timber operators in East
Malaysia . . . distort state policies, weaken state enforcement,
and drive unsustainable logging. To maintain loyalty and sup-
port . . . top political patrons grant timber concessions to key
political and business clients . . . Timber profits fuel powerful
patron-client networks. These networks are highly unstable,
rupturing as political parties vie for power in East Malaysia’s
ethnically diverse landscape. As a result, concessions are fre-
quently annulled . . . [and] incentives for long-term manage-
ment are sorely lacking . . . Instead, concessionaires and timber
companies race to extract as much timber as possible (1997:
99).
Corruption involving timber concessions is a common phe-
nomenon in the tropical timber industry. Local bureaucrats and
politicians often profit from illegal logging (Barr et al., 2006). ‘‘[I]
n many cases over fifty percent of the wood yield involves some
illegal action” (Burgess et al., 2011: 1). The productive aspect of
these power relations (Knafo, 2010) became clear when the for-
estry director called upon four timber corporations to purchase
BCCs. One NGO member explains: ‘‘the director of forestry was
like: buy some credits, so we can show at the launch that some
credits were sold . . . It wasn’t like they volunteered”. A New Forests
representatives thinks out loud:
It might be, you know, you will get this to harvest if you make
this donation, or I’ll ignore this infringement. They made the
donation, they got a certificate, and at the annual dinner that
Sam holds for all forestry stakeholders, they get to go up and
everybody claps, and they got the Sam . . . approval.
Rather than through brute force, it was done through negotia-
tion and public celebration. The drive of corporations to seek inter-
nal legitimation and maintain good relationships with the forestry
department, rather than invest into green PR/CSR fits well with the
history of close patron–client relationships that is so particular to
timber politics in Sabah. Despite the decline in timber production,
these networks remain important (and may even become more
important?), as pressure for short-term profit may be accelerating.
At the same time, the economic and political importance of the for-
estry department is declining, and while it is still holding on to its
image of being rich and powerful, its director needs to find new
sources of legitimacy and power. These historical conditions
enable him to test out new avenues, and use his power over the
(relatively weaker) timber industry to set up the BioBank. Mean-
while, international pressure has built up to protect the remaining
primary forests on Borneo (based on its construction as a ‘biodiver-
sity hotspot’) and save the last orang-utans. While protecting
sovereignty and fostering a nationalistic discourse which empha-
sises independence from the West(ern environmentalists), the Bio-
Bank thus serves as a means to reconcile these concerns.
6.3. Institutionalised power relations – business, Yaysan Sabah and the
different levels of government
The forestry department is anchored directly under the Sabah
Chief Minister, who, importantly, simultaneously controls Yayasan
Sabah and appoints the forestry director. The director is therefore3 As Roff (in Majid-Cooke, 1995: 226) explains: ‘‘the departing British authorities
bequeathed to carefully selected indigenous leaders valuable licenses to extract
timber. Thus financed and (once they were elected to government) possessing
unprecedented power, East Malaysia’s political leader had much to disburse by way of
patronage, and undoubtedly used this to build support for themselves and their
policies.”restrained in his policy options – he cannot simply ban logging,
withhold palm oil concessions or increase taxation. Although Yaya-
san Sabah is supposed to work independently, this political control
by the state government means that forest resources become a
source of political power, allowing for illegal bribing and resource
extraction. Not only are profits (re)directed for political purposes
(interviewee from Yayasan Sabah), but the allocation of forest con-
cessions for timber or palm oil is intrinsically political – reproduc-
ing existing power structures.
Palm oil industry representation (in addition to its close links to
the government) is institutionalised in the ‘‘ABC” (association,
board and council). These bodies are mainly government-funded
and their role is to ‘‘greenwash the industry and lobby”, I am told
by one conservationist, to promote palm oil interests and selec-
tively fund research and conservation activities. These power rela-
tions are further facilitated by a legal framework protecting
individual and corporate rights over communal rights.6.4. Individual, state and communal rights
Under the existing institutional framework (and rooted in its
colonial past and history of landgrabbing from indigenous commu-
nities), rights are granted to individuals, groups and companies.
Three types of property rights exist in Sabah: State property rights
(state land, including forest reserves), private property rights (land
for development, e.g. palm oil) and communal property rights
(land claimed by indigenous communities) (Toh and Grace,
2006). According to the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia,
Sabah scored 2nd in land rights problems for indigenous people;
the government frequently disregards native customary rights
and ‘‘has been very harsh and kicked people off the land” (conser-
vationist). Authorities regularly fail to act upon land grabs by pri-
vate companies (Vanar, 2012). Native customary rights are weak
and often not complied with (PACOS in Dayang Norwana et al.,
2011: 3). Additionally, ‘‘[t]he land title application can be a long
process and the outcome is often influenced by local politics”
(Dayang Norwana et al., 2011: 14). Enforcement of social safe-
guards to protect communities is weak and implementation is
poor. Individuals’ and corporations’ rights, in contrast, are strictly
enforced (conservationist).
Market instruments require individual rights, and the state is
responsible for their protection. Importantly, the legal framework
itself is not necessarily discriminatory, but it is selectively mobi-
lised and exploited. Legislation which prohibits hunting by locals,
for instance, is usually strongly enforced (though exceptions are
made), whereas environmental legislation is handled much more
laxly. As one high-level wildlife officer explains: ‘‘[It’s] mostly a
negotiation process! Legal [action] doesn’t work, because then they
will engage lawyers to go against us”.7. Strategies of action – politics of scale and strategic coalition
building
To reach goals, actors selectively work at and involve others
from different scales of governance. As Lebel et al. observe, ‘‘Actors
can change power and authority by working at different spatial
levels . . . Scale choices can be means of inclusion or exclusion”
(2005: 18). The forestry director is one individual who not only
shows personal leadership, but also strategically operates across
scales. Internationally, he works hard ‘‘to promote an image of
Sabah where deforestation is ‘slowing’ and precious areas are being
rescued from logging” (SarawakReport, 2012a). He was invited by
the Prince of Wales, at the political forefront in promoting green
investments or ‘‘making ecosystem services pay so that they
attract corporate investors” (Prince of Wales, 2011), to hold a key-
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Forum in 2011, promoting ‘‘green Sabah” and praising its sustain-
able forest management.
At the same time, the director has been successful in promoting
this international discourse on the local level and maintaining
strong relationships. He is widely admired as a progressive and
visionary leader, without whom the BioBank would not have
materialised;
The forestry department is very forward-thinking, and that’s
mostly due to the director . . . quite progressive, radical . . . Sam
has always been pushing for alternatives [like] carbon cred-
its . . . looked for whatever is new and might bring money
(conservationist).
He is very much aware of, and reproduces this image. He
approached the chief minister and promoted the BioBank as
something which has never been tried before . . . Everybody
makes money . . . it’s very innovative. If it works, then we can
apply it to other areas. And the chief minister agreed . . . so it
was approved (high-level forestry official).7.1. Strategic coalition-building
In order to promote particular neoliberal practices, ‘‘[a]ctors
seek to build coalitions of firms, governmental agencies, NGOs,
and intellectuals who can establish policies, norms, and institu-
tions that structure the field in particular ways” (Levy and Egan,
2003: 810). The involvement of NGOs, or the ‘‘recruit[ment of]
mainstream environmental organisations into the historical bloc”
(Levy and Egan, 2003: 812) is crucial in this coalition-building.
The forestry department has been fostering a very good relation-
ship with mainstream conservation organisations; they work clo-
sely together. These NGOs are regularly consulted and rarely
confront or criticise the government (Butler, 2013). Other local
actors selectively involve international NGOs to pursue their goals,
as the Yayasan Sabah official explains:
It’s good to have international NGOs to sometimes say NO. Our
strategy has been to get a lot of international parties to come in,
to build strong defence against any political things . . . If it’s just
us, they will just bulldoze us.
Meanwhile, more radical NGOs have not been able to settle, or
were expelled from the country; ‘‘Greenpeace would never be
allowed in Malaysia” one conservationist states. The palm oil
industry has played its role in creating hostility against more ‘rad-
ical’ and Western NGOs (LEAP interviewee). As the conservationist
continues sarcastically;
Greenpeace! Yeah, they are bad. They bomb things, don’t they?
Greenpeace will never be able to establish in Malaysia, because
they are seen as radical . . . [The Palm Oil Council] has managed
to make a lot of Malaysians feel like Westerners are attacking
us.
Further-reaching critique of the government is limited to a
handful of community-based social organisations. Here, people
struggle to bring forward alternative discourses based on human
rights and common property. However, as they are often not con-
sulted, and less prominent in the Malaysian media, their influence
is limited. The state defends its interests aggressively: organisa-
tions which criticise palm oil may be publicly delegitimised, por-
trayed as ‘‘against national interest and national security” and
accused of ‘‘inciting communities . . . to reject development,” I am
told by one NGO member; the setup or entry of NGOs is made dif-
ficult: ‘‘You almost never get a certificate. So what they do is set upcompanies”. Financial resources and legitimacy are channelled to
moderate groups. Civil society actors agree that organisations such
as WWF have the power ‘‘to bring ideas into government” (conser-
vationist); it managed to initiate a big green economy project in
Sabah, promoting monetary valuation and commodification and
involving policy-makers. Through this long-term coalition-
building strategy, the government not only gains legitimacy and
trust, but the neoliberal discourse is further spread and natu-
ralised, and mainstreamNGOs, such asWWF, and their green econ-
omy agenda are empowered.8. Rethinking neoliberalisation of nature in Sabah – from free-
market discourse to new mode of governance
Despite the prominence of markets and for-profit-motives in
the narratives surrounding the BioBank, it is only on a discursive
level that control over biodiversity governance is being relegated
to market actors. As in every market, the state was instrumental
in the construction of the BioBank: it negotiated with transnational
capital (Australian finance), civil society (LEAP) and local capital
(palm oil and timber), and exercised pressure on the latter to pur-
chase BCCs. Existing power relations were mobilised to create a
first market exchange; demand and supply. The price of US$10/
m2 was also determined by the forestry department.
More importantly, however, the BioBank has empowered the
forestry government and constitutes a way to enhance its control
over Sabah’s forests rather than losing control to the market. The
instrument opened an additional channel of financial resources
for the work the department would have to do nonetheless, and
enabled it to exercise its power over corporations and local com-
munities. This may help regain control over natural resource man-
agement – currently mainly controlled by networks of elites
connected to the state government, rather than the forestry
department – without directly challenging them. As Konings has
argued, ‘‘neoliberalism has involved the construction of control
that serve as sources of power for the state and those who enjoy
privileged access or relations to its organisations mechanisms –
capacities that are built on the narrowing elbow room available
to subordinate actors” (2010: 743). The latter is quite literally the
physical access of indigenous communities and local workers.
The BioBank was used to legitimise restricting access for local com-
munities, discursively and materially through the employment of
additional (armed) rangers and forestry officials who patrol the
borders. It involved the takeup of additional functions, e.g. running
workshops with indigenous communities. The forestry department
further strategically cooperates with and draws on other actors – e.
g. palm oil corporation security guards – for the ‘‘protection” of the
forest. Effectively, the BioBank enables the forestry department to
render (previously unproductive) land governable and productive,
almost legitimating its existence. Through these newly created or
expanded functions it also empowered to govern local (indige-
nous) communities, through disciplining as well as through co-
optation, by employing a small number of locals as rangers. On
the transnational level, the BioBank and its perceived innovative-
ness legitimise the forestry director, and enhance his image as pro-
gressive and modern, and development-friendly yet
‘environmentalist’ (he is regularly invited to international confer-
ences on biodiversity offsetting) – both in Sabah and abroad. In
the face of widespread state cronyism and corruption on the state
level, criticised (inter)nationally, this serves to improve his image.
At the same time, it coexists peacefully next to the discourse on
modernisation and growth as development, based on nationalist
sentiments.
This shows that in Sabah, marketisation of nature represents
not only the individualisation and privatisation of responsibility,
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erning. Rather than representing the enactment of a free-market
ideology, or even giving in on the pressure of capital or ‘the mar-
ket’, it is triggered by a particular configuration of actors, situated
in a particular historical context, acting predominantly pragmati-
cally. Neoliberal discourse and practices are clearly divergent. In
this particular case, the practice also didn’t fit with the related
neoliberal ideas of voluntary business action and corporate social
responsibility. It was widely expected that companies would buy
certificates to improve their reputation. As one forestry official
explains: ‘‘You can show business partners that you’ve invested
something into this conservation, it is good for the PR . . . Then they
see this as a value to the business”. However, companies acted sur-
prised when asked about CSR potential. They regard their partici-
pation as much more important to foster a good relationship
with the forestry department and Yayasan Sabah, to secure a
license to operate and regulatory goodwill. At the launch, a ‘‘big
fancy conference . . . people who were there from the business
industry were there because of forestry department, and people
who bought, bought because they were told by forestry depart-
ment”, one conservationist describes. The dynamics were thus
much more internally rather than PR-motivated.9. Conclusion
My analysis of BioBanking in Sabah showed that marketisation
was not the product of an inherent drive of neoliberal capitalism to
expand, or corporate interests pressuring governments, but the
product of a coalition of actors coming together, in a particular
point in time, with particular interests.
This is not to say that structures and power relations were
absent in Sabah. The state government has to protect the interest
of capital, primarily palm oil, while increasingly being under pres-
sure to undertake policy action to reduce biodiversity loss through
deforestation and conversion. Policy initiatives that constrain prof-
its and challenge power relations are therefore difficult to realise;
‘‘Any threat to an industry’s markets . . . is inherently a political
threat” (Levy and Egan, 2003: 812). These constraints inhibit cer-
tain fundamental structural changes, but they empower others,
and are instrumentalised to ‘get things done’. Powerful individuals,
most notably the forestry director, invoke and utilise the institu-
tional structures, hegemonic discourses and interest configurations
to introduce new mechanisms, such as the BioBank, which don’t
challenge the status quo political economy and enhance the
department’s control over Sabah’s forests. Forests continue to func-
tion as political capital – both nationally, but now also internation-
ally (comparable to REDD+).
I illustrated how, by whom, and with which effect the hege-
monic discourse has been introduced and invoked; and modified
and resisted on the ground. This effectively positions actors in cer-
tain ways – the government as modern, rational, and science-
based; business as saviours of biodiversity, and indigenous com-
munities as backwards, un-patriotic and endangering wildlife.
Though not directly visible, transnational actors have played an
important role in the setup of the BioBank by introducing the
neoliberal rhetoric and practices (e.g. REDD preparation projects).
They not only support the status quo ideologically and discursively
(e.g. Prince of Wales), but also financially (palm oil agriculture, PES
schemes). The agency of transnational actors, and the adoption by
locals enabled the discursive commodification and marketisation
of nature, and the depoliticisation and reduction of biodiversity
loss to the local endangerment of the orang-utan in Sabah. This
problem construction in turn facilitated the positioning of the Bio-
Bank as the equally anti-political, economically efficient and scien-
tifically grounded ‘technical’ solution to this problem.Effectively, it has led to increased control of the state, while
facilitating and legitimating accumulation. Accumulation comes
at the cost of local communities, who not only fail to profit from
the BioBank, but fall victims to illegal bribing by the state govern-
ment and suffer from the negative environmental and social conse-
quences of palm oil agriculture. This is made possible by an
institutional legal framework which protects individual and corpo-
rate rights rather than communal rights, as well as institution-
alised power relations that facilitate illegal timber concessions
while allowing for the strategic operation across scale, e.g. the pro-
motion of a green image abroad. Additionally, the forestry depart-
ment has maintained strong relationships to mainstream
(international) NGOs, while critical voices are being marginalised.
‘‘The drive to sustain legitimacy and a broad alliance of social
actors is as important as more narrow economic activity” (Levy
and Egan, 2003: 812). Yet, local communities, officials and NGOs
are not simply victims of these processes; they actively adopt
and reproduce discourses for the sake of ‘getting things done’. Nev-
ertheless, some resistance is clearly visible, not least in the local
appropriation of the transnational discourse when talking about
‘love for nature’, and ‘selling love’.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Henk Overbeek, Bram Büscher, Peter Newell,
Frank Biermann, Mareike Beck, Sahil Dutta and Tom Martin for
their feedback on earlier versions of this article.
References
Bakker, K., 2004. An Uncooperative Commodity: Privatizing Water in England and
Wales. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bakker, K., 2005. Neoliberalizing nature? Market environmentalism in water supply
in England and Wales. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 95, 542–565.
Barr, C., Resosudarmo, I.A.P., Dermawan, A., Setiono, B., 2006. Decentralization’s
effects on forest concessions and timber production. In: Barr, C., Resosudarmo, I.
A.P., Dermawan, A., McCarthy, J. (Eds.), Decentralization of Forest
Administration in Indonesia: Implications for Forest Sustainability, Economic
Development and Community Livelihoods. Center for International Forestry
Research, Bogor, Indonesia, pp. 87–107.
Basiron, Y., 2010. Palmoil: Getting the Facts Right. <http://www.ceopalmoil.com/>
(accessed 14.03.15).
Bayon, R., 2002. Making Money in Environmental Derivatives. New America
Foundation, <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/
2002/making_money_in_environmental_derivatives> (accessed 14.03.15).
Beck, U., 2000. What is Globalization? Polity Press, Oxford, UK and Malden, MA,
USA.
Brenner, N., Theodore, N., 2002. Cities and the geographies of ‘‘actually existing
neoliberalism”. Antipode 34 (3), 349–379.
Brockington, D., Duffy, R., 2010. Capitalism and conservation: the production and
reproduction of biodiversity conservation. Antipode 42 (3), 469–484.
Brockington, D., Duffy, R., Igoe, J., 2008. Nature Unbound: Conservation, Capitalism,
and the Future of Protected Areas. Earthscan, London.
Burgess, R., Hansen, M., Olken, B., Potapov, P., Sieber, S., 2011. The Political Economy
of Deforestation in the Tropics. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17417>
(accessed 14.03.15).
Büscher, B., 2010a. Derivative nature: interrogating the value of conservation in
‘Boundless Southern Africa’. Third World Quart. 31 (2), 259–276.
Büscher, B., 2010b. Anti-politics as political strategy: neoliberalism and
transfrontier conservation in Southern Africa. Develop. Change 41 (1), 29–51.
Büscher, B., 2011. The neoliberalisation of nature in Africa. In: Dietz, T., Havnevik, K.,
Kaag, M., Oestigaard, T. (Eds.), African Engagements: Africa Negotiating an
Emerging Multipolar World. Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, NL, pp. 84–109.
Büscher, B., Sullivan, S., Neves, K., Igoe, J., Brockington, D., 2012. Towards a
synthesized critique of neoliberal biodiversity conservation. Capit. Nat. Social.
23 (2), 4–30.
Butler, R.A., 2008. Private Equity Seek Profit from Rainforest Wildlife Conservation.
Mongabay, <http://news.mongabay.com/2008/0813-malua_new_forests.
html#FQp55e46ittvUJtR.99> (accessed 14.03.15).
Butler, R.A., 2012. Industrial Logging Leaves a Poor Legacy in Borneo’s Rainforests.
Mongabay, <http://news.mongabay.com/2012/0717-borneo-logging.html?
utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=twitterfeed> (accessed 14.03.15).
Butler, R.A., 2013. Malaysian NGOs Boldly Demand Forest Conservation Action in
Borneo. Mongabay, <http://news.mongabay.com/2013/0228-sabah-ngo-
demands.html#jEW6rG4ylQAB2Czy.99> (accessed 14.03.15).
Castree, N., 2008. Neoliberalising nature: the logics of deregulation and
reregulation. Environ. Plan. A 40 (1), 131–152.
A. Brock / Geoforum 65 (2015) 278–290 289Chang, H.J., 2002. Breaking the mould: an institutionalist political economy
alternative to the neo-liberal theory of the market and the state. Camb. J.
Econ. 26 (05), 539–559.
Cox, R.W., 1983. Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in
method. Millen.: J. Int. Stud. 12 (2), 162–175.
Cox, R.W., 1986. Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international
relations theory. In: Keohane, R.O. (Ed.), Neorealism and its Critics. Columbia
University Press, New York, pp. 204–254.
Dauvergne, P., 1997. Shadows in the Forest: Japan and the Politics of Timber in
Southeast Asia. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Dayang Norwana, A.A.B., Kunjappan, R., Chin, M., Schoneveld, G., Potter, L., Andriani,
R., 2011. The Local Impacts of Oil Palm Expansion in Malaysia: An Assessment
Based on a Case Study in Sabah State. CIFOR, <http://www.cifor.org/
publications/pdf_files/WPapers/WP-78Andriani.pdf> (accessed 14.03.15).
Edwards, L., Cahill, D., Stilwell, F., 2012. Introduction: understanding neoliberalism
beyond the free market. In: Cahill, D., Edwards, L., Stilwell, F. (Eds.),
Neoliberalism: Beyond the Free Market. Edward Elger, Cheltenham, UK, and
Northampton, USA.
Eftec, IEEP, 2010. The Use of Market-based Instruments for Biodiversity Protection –
The Case of Habitat Banking. Technical Report. <ec.europa.eu/environment/
enveco/pdf/eftec_habitat_technical_report.pdf> (accessed 14.03.15).
Ferraro, P.J., Simpson, R.D., 2002. The cost-effectiveness of conservation payments.
Land Econ. 78 (3), 339–353.
FPP (Forest People Program), n.d. Wilmar International. <http://www.forestpeoples.
org/tags/wilmar-international> (accessed 14.03.15).
Global Witness, 2012. Wills & Kate Need to Examine Real Causes of Forest
Destruction in Malaysia. <http://www.globalwitness.org/library/wills-
kate-need-examine-real-causes-forest-destruction-malaysia> (accessed 14.03.
15).
Gripne, S., 2008. Markets for Biodiversity: Delivering Returns from Emerging
Environmental Markets. PERC Report 26(4). <http://perc.org/articles/markets-
biodiversity> (accessed 14.03.15).
Harvey, D., 2001. Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography. Routledge, New
York.
Harvey, D., 2004. The ’new’ imperialism: accumulation by dispossession. Social.
Regist. 40, 63–87.
Holmes, G., 2012. Biodiversity for billionaires: capitalism, conservation and the role
of philanthropy in saving/selling nature. Develop. Change 43 (1), 185–203.
ICE, 2012. The Malaysian Palm Oil Sector – Overview. Trade and Economic Section,
European Union Delegation to Malaysia. <http://www.ice.gov.it/paesi/
asia/malaysia/upload/173/Palm%20Oil_overview_2012.pdf> (accessed
14.03.15).
ICMM (International Council on Mining & Metals), 2005. Biodiversity Offsets: A
Briefing Paper for the Mining Industry. ICMM, London.
Igoe, J., 2010. The spectacle of nature and the global economy of appearances:
anthropological engagements with the images of transnational conservation.
Crit. Anthropol. 30 (4), 375–397.
Knafo, S., 2010. Critical approaches and the legacy of the agent/structure debate in
international relations. Camb. Rev. Int. Affairs 23 (3), 493–516.
Konings, M., 2010. Neoliberalism and the American State. Crit. Sociol. 36 (5), 741–
765.
Koswanage, N., 2013. Insight: In Malaysia’s Election, A Focus on Rainforest Graft.
REUTERS, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, April 2, 2013. <http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/04/02/us-malaysia-politics-idUSBRE9310ZL20130402> (accessed
14.03.15).
Krippner, G.R., 2001. The elusive market: embeddedness and the paradigm of
economic sociology. Theory Soc. 30 (6), 775–810.
Larner, W., 2003. Neoliberalism? Environ. Plan. D: Soc. Space 21, 509–512.
LEAP, n.d. Vision and Strategy. <http://www.leapspiral.org/content/about_leap.
php> (accessed 14.03.15).
Lebel, L., Garden, P., Imamura, M., 2005. The politics of scale, position, and place in
the governance of water resources in the Mekong region. Ecol. Soc. 10 (2), 18–
37.
Levy, D.L., Egan, D., 2003. A neo-gramscian approach to corporate political strategy:
conflict and accommodation in the climate change negotiations. J. Manage.
Stud. 40 (4), 803–829.
Liverman, D., 2004. Who governs, at what scale and what price? Geography,
environmental governance, and the commodification of nature. Ann. Assoc. Am.
Geogr. 94 (4), 734–738.
Madsen, B., Carroll, N., Moore Brands, K., 2010. State of Biodiversity Markets Report:
Offset and Compensation Programs Worldwide. Forest Trends, Washington, DC,
<http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/acrobat/sbdmr.pdf>
(accessed 14.03.15).
Madsen, B., Carroll, N., Kandy, D., Bennett, G., 2011. Update: State of Biodiversity
Markets. Forest Trends, Washington, DC, <http://www.
ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/acrobat/sbdmr.pdf> (accessed
14.03.15).
Majid-Cooke, F., 1995. The politics of sustained yield forest management in
Malaysia: constructing the boundaries of time, control and consent. Geoforum
26 (4), 445–458.
Malua BioBank, 2010. Biodiversity Conservation Certificates. <http://
www.maluabank.com/explore.php?id=How_it_works> (accessed 14.03.15).
Malua BioBank, n.d. How does it Work? <http://www.maluabank.com/explore.php?
id=infographic> (accessed 14.03.15).
Mansfield, B., 2004. Rules of privatization: contradictions in neoliberal regulation of
North Pacific fisheries. Ann. Assoc. Am. Geogr. 94, 565–584.McAfee, K., 1999. Selling nature to save it? Biodiversity and green
developmentalism. Environ. Plan. D: Soc. Space 17 (2), 133–154.
McAfee, K., 2003. Neoliberalism on the molecular scale. Geoforum 34, 203–220.
McAfee, K., 2012. The contradictory logic of global ecosystem services markets.
Develop. Change 43 (1), 105–131.
McElwee, P.D., 2012. Payments for environmental services as neoliberal market-
based forest conservation in Vietnam: Panacea or problem? Geoforum 43 (3),
412–426.
Milne, S., Adams, B., 2012. Market masquerades: uncovering the politics of
community-level payments for environmental services in Cambodia. Develop.
Change 43 (1), 133–158.
Mosse, D., 2004. Is good policy unimplementable? Reflections on the ethnography
of aid policy and practice. Develop. Change 35 (4), 639–671.
Nagle, J.C., 2009. The effectiveness of biodiversity law. J. Land Use Environ. Law 24,
203–252.
NBU (Nyenrode Business Universiteit), n.d. The Eco Products Fund LP. <http://www.
nyenrode.nl/FacultyResearch/Entrepreneurship-Stewardship/
CS/workingconferenceCfS/Pages/The-Eco-Products-Fund-LP-%28EPF%29.aspx?
AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1> (accessed 14.03.15).
Newell, P., Paterson, M., 1998. A climate for business: global warming, the state and
capital. Rev. Int. Polit. Econ. 5 (4), 679–703.
NewForests, n.d. Investment Strategies: Asia Pacific. <http://www.newforests.com.
au/investment/asia.php> (accessed 13.05.13).
Pang, T.W., 2011. An important contributor: OBG talks to Pang Teck Wai, CEO, Palm
Oil Industrial Cluster (POIC) Sabah. In: The Report: Sabah 2011. Oxford Business
Group.
Perkins, H.A., 2011. Gramsci in green: neoliberal hegemony through urban forestry
and the potential for a political ecology of praxis. Geoforum 42 (5), 558–566.
Pokorny, B., Johnson, J., Medina, G., Hoch, L., 2010. Market-based conservation of the
Amazonian forests: revisiting win-win expectations. Geoforum 43 (3), 387–401.
Polanyi, K., 1957. The Great Transformation. Beacon Press, Boston.
POST (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology), 2011. Biodiversity
Offsetting. Postnote 369. <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/postpn_
369-biodiversity-offsetting.pdf> (accessed 02.08.15).
Prince of Wales, 2011. A Speech by HRH The Prince of Wales to the WWF/Global
Forest Trade Network. <http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/media/speeches/
speech-hrh-the-prince-of-wales-the-wwf-global-forest-trade-network>
(accessed 14.03.15).
Prudham, S., 2004. Poisoning the well: neoliberalism and the contamination of
municipal water in Walkerton, Ontario. Geoforum 35, 343–360.
Pye, O., 2010. The biofuel connection – transnational activism and the palm oil
boom. J. Peas. Stud. 37 (4), 851–874.
Reynolds, G., Payne, J., Sinun, W., Mosigil, G., Walsh, R.P.D., 2011. Changes in forest
land use and management in Sabah, Malaysian Borneo, 1990–2010, with a focus
on the Danum Valley region. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 366, 3168–3176.
Robertson, M.M., 2004. The neoliberalization of ecosystem services: wetland
mitigation banking and problems in environmental governance. Geoforum 35
(3), 361–373.
Robertson, M., 2009. The work of wetland credit markets: two cases in
entrepreneurial wetland banking. Wetlands Ecol. Manage. 17, 35–51.
SarawakReport, 2012a. UK Press Reports ‘‘Diplomatic Row” Over William & Kate’s
Sabah Visit. Kuching, Malaysia. <http://www.sarawakreport.org/2012/09/uk-
press-take-note-of-william-kate-protests/> (accessed 14.03.15).
SarawakReport, 2012b. Sabah’s Smoking Gun! Bank Statements Show that Musa
Aman’s Sons Accessed Dirty Money. Kuching, Malaysia. <http://www.
sarawakreport.org/2012/04/sabahs-smoking-gun-bank-statements-show-that-
musa-amans-sons-accessed-dirty-money-national-exclusive/> (accessed
14.03.15).
SarawakReport, 2012c. HSBC’s Money-Laundering Scandal – Time to Probe the
Musa Connection! Kuching, Malaysia. <http://www.sarawakreport.org/2012/
07/hsbcs-money-laundering-scandal-time-to-probe-the-musa-connection/>
(accessed 14.03.15).
Sewell, W.H., 1982. A theory of structures: duality, agency, and transformation. Am.
J. Sociol. 98 (1), 1–29.
SFD (Sabah Forestry Department), n.d. Welcome to Ulusegama-Malua Website.
<http://www.forest.sabah.gov.my/usm/> (accessed 14.03.15).
Silver, J., 2009. TZ1 registry: using world leading infrastructure to integrate
traceability and credibility into emerging environmental markets. Presentation
at Ecosystem Markets: Making Them Work. Portland, Oregon. <http://www.
nebc.org/documents/ecosys09/6A-Silver.pdf> (accessed 14.03.13).
Smith, N., 2007. Nature as accumulation strategy. Social. Regist. 43, 19–41.
Stern, N., 2007. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge and New York.
Sullivan, S., 2006. The elephant in the room? Problematizing ‘new’ (neoliberal)
biodiversity conservation. Forum Develop. Stud. 33 (1), 105–135.
Sullivan, S., 2012. Financialisation, Biodiversity Conservation and Equity: Some
Currents and Concerns. Environment and Development Series 16. Third World
Network, Penang, Malaysia.
Sullivan, S., 2013a. After the green rush? Biodiversity offsets, uranium power and
the ‘calculus of casualties’ in greening growth. Hum. Geogr. 6 (1), 80–101.
Sullivan, S., 2013b. Banking nature? The spectacular financialisation of
environmental conservation. Antipode 45 (1), 198–217.
Sunjoto, I.P., Radin, A.M., Lagan, P., n.d. Malua Wildlife Habitat Conservation Bank –
An Innovative Approach for Conservation in Sabah. <http://www.forest.
sabah.gov.my/usm/pdf/Malua%20Wildlife_Habitat_Conservation_Bank%
28vetted_ver%29.pdf> (accessed 13.03.15).
290 A. Brock / Geoforum 65 (2015) 278–290Tauli-Corpuz, V., Tamang, P., 2007. Oil Palm and Other Commercial Tree Plantations,
Monocropping: Impacts on Indigenous Peoples’ Land Tenure and Resource
Management Systems and Livelihoods. E/C.19/2007/CRP.6. Permanent Forum
on Indigenous Issues, Sixth Session. New York.
TEEB, 2010. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the
Economics of Nature: A Synthesis of the Approach, Conclusions and
Recommendations of TEEB.
Ten Kate, K., Bishop, J., Bayon, R., 2004. Biodiversity Offsets: Views, Experience, and
the Business Case. IUCN and Insight Investment, Gland, Cambridge, London.
Timbervest, n.d. Investing in Environmental Assets and Biodiversity. <http://
www.timbervest.net/crossover/sub_mb.php> (accessed 14.03.15).
Toh, S.M., Grace, K.T., 2006. Case Study: Sabah Forest Ownership for Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Global Forestry Services Inc.,
<http://www.fao.org/forestry/10515-0462aee542d13dc983cd2bb1d09c073fa.
pdf> (accessed 13.03.15).Van Hecken, G., Bastiaensen, J., 2010. Payments for ecosystem services: justified or
not? A political view. Environ. Sci. Policy 13 (8), 785–792.
UNDP-GEF, n.d. UNDP-GEF Biodiversity Projects under Implementation in 2010–
2011. <http://web.undp.org/gef/document/Biodiversity%20project%20list.pdf>
(accessed 14.03.15).
Vanar, M., 2012. Suhakam Inquiry Highlights Issues Faced by Sabah’s Indigenous
People. Suhakam. <http://www.suhakam.org.my/suhakam-inquiry-highlights-
issues-faced-by-sabahs-indigenous-people/> (accessed 13.03.15).
Wakker, E., 2005. Greasy Palms: The Social and Ecological Impacts of Large-scale Oil
Palm Plantation Development in Southeast Asia. Friends of the Earth.
Walsh, B., 2011. Paying for nature. TIME Magazine. <http://content.ti
me.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2048324,00.html#ixzz1G6ELwNFC>
(accessed 13.05.15).
